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Abstract
We analyze a two-player game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits.
Each player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known
payoﬀ or a risky arm whose likelihood of delivering payoﬀs is initially unknown. The
quality of the risky arms is perfectly negatively correlated between players. In marked
contrast to the case where both risky arms are of the same type, we ﬁnd that learn-
ing will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium if the stakes exceed a certain
threshold, and that all equilibria are in cutoﬀ strategies. For low stakes, the equilib-
rium is unique, symmetric, and coincides with the planner’s solution. For high stakes,
the equilibrium is unique, symmetric, and tantamount to myopic behavior. For inter-
mediate stakes, there is a continuum of equilibria.
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Two-armed bandit problems as a means of modeling the trade-oﬀ between experimentation
and exploitation have already received a quite extensive treatment in the literature thus far,
even though most of the interest has been decision-theoretic, i.e. focussing on single-agent
problems. Only recently has strategic interaction been introduced into the model: Bolton
and Harris (1999, 2000) analyze the case of Brownian motion bandits, while Keller, Rady,
Cripps (2005) as well as Keller and Rady (2007) analyze Poisson bandits. All of the previous
literature, however, has assumed perfect positive correlation across bandits; what was good
news to any given player was assumed to be good news for everybody else.
In the real world, however, situations abound where one man’s boon is the other one’s
bane. Think of a suit at law, for instance: Whatever is good news for one party is bad news
for the other. An appropriate model of strategic interaction in such a setup would, as a
matter of course, assume correlation across bandits was negative. This we propose to do in
the present paper.1
In this respect, our work is related to Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), who, in a moral
hazard setting, which bears no resemblance to ours, pose the question whether it is socially
better to adjudicate disputes through a centralized system of gathering evidence, which they
assimilate to the inquisitorial system of Civil Law countries, or whether the interests of
justice may be better served in a decentralized, adversarial system, as it is found in the
Common Law countries. They show that, in a centralized system, it is not possible to give
adequate incentives to make sure the truth is uncovered, and conclude that the Common Law
system of gathering information was therefore superior. Our model provides an alternative
framework to ascertain the eﬀectiveness of information-gathering processes in a strategic
setting where the parties’ interests are diametrically opposed.
Rather surprisingly, in our setup, all Markov perfect equilibria are in cutoﬀ strate-
gies (i.e. of the form “play risky at beliefs more optimistic than some threshold, and safe
otherwise”). While this structure of optimal strategies is prevalent in single-agent bandit
problems, our result is in stark contrast to Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), who ﬁnd that
there is no such equilibrium when all risky arms are of the same type.
On account of the symmetry of the situation, it is not surprising that there always
exists a symmetric equilibrium, where both players use the same cutoﬀ. This symmetric
1There is a decision-theoretic literature on correlated bandits which analyzes correlation across diﬀerent
arms of a bandit operated by a single agent; see e.g. Camargo (2007) for a recent contribution to this
literature, or Pastorino (2005) for economic applications. Our focus here is quite diﬀerent, though, in that we
are concerned with correlation between diﬀerent bandits operated by two players who interact strategically.
1equilibrium is unique. What is more, we are able to show that for a large set of parameter
values, there is no other equilibrium besides the symmetric one. This uniqueness result is
again in sharp contrast to the multiplicity of equilibria in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005).
When the stakes (as measured by the payoﬀ advantage of a good risky arm over a safe
one) are low, the unique equilibrium is eﬃcient. This is due to the fact that, with low stakes,
single-agent cutoﬀ beliefs are so optimistic that the two bandit problems essentially fail to
interact. Hence, the social planner will treat them as two separate problems, and will let the
players behave as though they were single agents, which is then obviously consistent with
equilibrium.
When the stakes are high, equilibrium is again unique, and it amounts to the players’
behaving myopically, and hence ineﬃciently. With the stakes high, players are so eager to
play risky that there exists a range of beliefs where both are experimenting. Of course,
when both are doing the same thing with the same result, there is no new information made
available. Thus, the players are essentially shutting down the incremental learning process,
keeping the belief at its current value and eﬀectively freezing the problem in its current state.
This, however, they are only willing to do if the current state is attractive from a myopic
perspective.
If the stakes are intermediate in size, there is a continuum of equilibria. As the stakes
gradually increase and we move from the low to the intermediate case, at ﬁrst, given any
initial belief, there still exists among the continuum of equilibria one that is eﬃcient. As
stakes increase further, there then appears a range of initial beliefs for which no equilibrium
achieves eﬃciency. As we move from high stakes down to intermediate stakes, there at
ﬁrst always exists an equilibrium that involves one player behaving myopically. To achieve
this, the other player has to bear the entire load of experimentation by himself when the
uncertainty is greatest. As stakes gradually grow lower, however, the other player will at
some point no longer be willing to bear this burden, and the equilibrium disappears.
Our strategic setting assumes that either player’s actions and payoﬀs are perfectly ob-
servable to the other player. Hence, information that is garnered via experimentation is
a public good. Therefore, intuition would suggest, and the previous literature would con-
ﬁrm, that levels of experimentation were depressed by an inherent free-rider problem and
learning would often cease prematurely. Our analysis, however, shows that incompleteness
of information gathering, which has been prevalent throughout the previous strategic ex-
perimentation literature, can be overcome by competition between two antagonistic agents.
More precisely, we ﬁnd that, in equilibrium, learning will be complete whenever this is eﬃ-
cient. Thus, whenever society places a lot of emphasis on uncovering the truth, as one may
argue is the case with the justice system, our analysis would suggest an adversarial setup
2was superior.2
Our analysis would furthermore suggest that competition was conducive to investment
in risky experimentation. This is consistent with the recent literature on growth, innovation
and R&D which shows that decentralization of decision structures boosts investments in
innovation; see, for example, Aghion and Howitt (2006), Acemoglu et al. (2006), Aghion et
al. (2006).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 analyzes the planner’s solution. Section 4 sets up the non-cooperative game. Section 5
discusses long-run properties of learning in equilibrium. Section 6 characterizes the Markov
perfect equilibria of the non-cooperative game. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are provided in
the appendix.
2 The Model
There are two players, 1 and 2, each of whom faces a two-armed bandit problem in continuous
time. Bandits are of the exponential type studied in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). One
arm is safe in that it yields a known payoﬀ ﬂow of s; the other arm is risky in that it is
either good or bad. If it is bad, it never yields any payoﬀ; if it is good, it yields a lump-
sum payoﬀ with probability λdt when used over a time of length dt. Let g dt denote the
corresponding expected payoﬀ increment; thus, g is the product of the arrival rate λ and
the average size of a lump-sum payoﬀ. The time-invariant constants λ > 0 and g > 0 are
common knowledge. It is also common knowledge that exactly one bandit’s risky arm is
good. To have an interesting problem, we assume that the expected payoﬀ of a good risky
arm exceeds that of the safe arm, whereas the safe arm is better than a bad risky arm, i.e.,
g > s > 0.
The strategic link between the two players’ actions is provided by the assumption that
players perfectly observe each other’s actions and payoﬀs. Thus, as the bandits are perfectly
negatively correlated, any information that is garnered about the quality of the risky arm
is a public good. At the outset of the game, players have a common prior about which of
the risky arms is good. Since the results of each player’s experimentation are public, players
share a common posterior at all times. Let pt be the players’ posterior probability assessment
2Our complete learning result carries over to the situation where the players’ actions are publicly observ-
able, but their payoﬀs are private information. In this respect, our work is related to the growing literature
on strategic learning with private information; cf. Moscarini and Squintani (2004), Hopenhayn and Squintani
(2006), Murto and V¨ alim¨ aki (2006), and Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2007a, b).
3that player 1’s risky arm is good. This common posterior will serve as the problem’s state
variable, as it encapsulates all relevant information about the decision problem.
Each player chooses actions {kt}t≥0 such that kt ∈ {0,1} is measurable with respect to
the information available at time t, with kt = 1 indicating use of the risky arm, and kt = 0
use of the safe arm. The player’s total expected discounted payoﬀ, expressed in per-period
units, is
E
   ∞
0
re
−r t [(1 − kt)s + ktptg] dt
 
,
where the expectation is taken over the stochastic processes {kt} and {pt}, and r is the
players’ common discount rate.
The belief jumps to 1 if there has been a breakthrough on player 1’s bandit, and to 0 if
there has been a breakthrough on player 2’s bandit, where in either case it will remain ever
after. If the players choose the actions k1 and k2 over the time interval [t,t + ∆] and there
is no breakthrough on either bandit, Bayes’ rule gives us
pt+∆ =
pte−λk1∆
pte−λk1∆ + (1 − pt)e−λk2∆ ,
and so the belief solves the ordinary diﬀerential equation
˙ p = −(k1 − k2)λp(1 − p).
Note that for k1 = k2 = 1, the belief remains unchanged up to the ﬁrst breakthrough on a
risky arm.
3 The Planner’s Problem
In this section, we shall be examining a benevolent utilitarian social planner’s behavior in
our setup. Proceeding exactly as Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), we can write the Bellman
equation for the maximization of the average payoﬀ from the two bandits as
















where B1(p,u) = λ
rp[
g+s
2 −u(p)−(1−p)u′(p)] measures the expected beneﬁt of playing risky
arm 1, B2(p,u) = λ
r(1 − p)[
g+s
2 − u(p) + pu′(p)] the expected beneﬁt of playing risky arm
2, c1(p) = s − pg the opportunity cost of playing risky arm 1, and c2(p) = s − (1 − p)g the
opportunity cost of playing risky arm 2. Thus, the planner’s problem is linear in both k1
and k2, and the planner is maximizing separately over k1 and k2.
4If it is optimal to set k1 = k2 = 0, then the value function works out as u(p) = s. If it is















If it is optimal to set k1 = 0 and k2 = 1, then the Bellman equation amounts to the
ﬁrst-order ODE
λp(1 − p)u
′(p) − [r + λ(1 − p)]u(p) = −1
2 {[r + λ(1 − p)]s + (r + λ)(1 − p)g}.
This has the solution
u(p) = 1
2[s + (1 − p)g] + Cp
r+λ
λ (1 − p)
− r
λ,
where C is some constant of integration.
Finally, if it is optimal to set k1 = 1 and k2 = 0, then the Bellman equation is tantamount
to the ﬁrst-order ODE
λp(1 − p)u
′
1(p) + (r + λp)u1(p) = 1
2 {(r + λp)s + (r + λ)pg},
which is solved by
u(p) = 1





Note that whenever k1 = k2, the value function is ﬂat as the planner does not care which
arm is good. For the same reason, the problem is symmetric around p = 1
2. All the planner
cares about is the uncertainty that stands in the way of his realizing the upper bound on
the value function,
g+s
2 . Hence, intuitively, the planner’s value function will admit its global
minimum at p = 1
2, where the uncertainty is starkest.
It is clear that (k1,k2) = (1,0) will be optimal in a neighborhood of p = 1, and (k1,k2) =
(0,1) in a neighborhood of p = 0. What is optimal at beliefs around p = 1
2 depends on which
of the two possible plateaus s and u11 is higher. This in turn depends on the size of the stakes
involved, i.e. on the value of information as measured by the ratio
g
s, and on the parameters
λ and r that govern the speed of resolution of uncertainty and the planner’s impatience. In
fact, s > u11 if and only if
g
s < 2r+λ




r+λ , it is optimal for the planner to use k1 = k2 = 0 on ]1−p∗,p∗[,
(k1,k2) = (0,1) on [0,1−p∗[, and (k1,k2) = (1,0) on ]p∗,1], where p∗ = rs
(r+λ)g−λs > 1
2. The
choice of actions at 1 − p∗ and p∗ is of no consequence. The planner’s value function is
u(p) =

    















if p ≤ 1 − p∗,















if p ≥ p∗.
5Figure 1 illustrates the result. Interestingly, p∗ equals the cut-oﬀ belief for the single-
agent problem in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Thus, when the (social) value of infor-
mation, as measured by
g
s, is so low that the single-agent cutoﬀ p∗ > 1
2, it is optimal for the
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λp(1 − p) if p < 1 − p∗,
0 if 1 − p∗ ≤ p ≤ p∗,
−λp(1 − p) if p > p∗.
Let us suppose risky arm 1 is good. If the initial belief p0 < 1 − p∗, then the posterior
belief will converge to 1 − p∗ with probability 1 as there cannot be a breakthrough on risky
arm 2. If 1 − p∗ ≤ p0 ≤ p∗, the belief will remain unchanged at p0. If p0 > p∗, the belief
will converge either to 1 or to p∗. If t∗ is the length of time needed for the belief to reach
p∗ conditional on there not being a breakthrough on risky arm 1, the probability that the




p0e−λt in the absence




1−p∗ . The belief will therefore converge to p∗ (and




1−p∗, and to 1 (and hence the truth)
with the counter-probability. Analogous results hold when risky arm 2 is good.
Next, we turn to the case where u11 > s and so playing safe on both arms cannot be




r+λ , it is optimal for the planner to use k1 = k2 = 1 on ]¯ p,1− ¯ p[,




choice of actions at ¯ p and 1 − ¯ p is of no consequence. The planner’s value function is
u(p) =

    
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s + pg +
 












if p ≥ 1 − ¯ p.
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λp(1 − p) if p < ¯ p,
0 if ¯ p ≤ p ≤ 1 − ¯ p,
−λp(1 − p) if p > 1 − ¯ p.
Whenever the stakes are high, therefore, the planner shuts down incremental learning on
[¯ p,1 − ¯ p]. Yet he will still learn the truth with probability 1 in the long run because this
interval is absorbing for the posterior belief process in the absence of a breakthrough, and




r+λ , eﬃciency calls for complete learning, i.e., convergence of
the posterior belief p to the truth with probability 1. When
g
s < 2r+λ
r+λ , however, eﬃcient
learning can be incomplete.
7Note ﬁnally that when
g
s = 2r+λ
r+λ , ¯ p = p∗ = 1
2, and so both of the above results hold in
this knife-edge case.
4 The Strategic Problem
Our solution concept is Markov perfect equilibrium, with the players’ common posterior p as
the state variable. As strategies of player i = 1,2, we allow all functions ki : [0,1] → {0,1}
for which k
−1
i (1) is the union of a ﬁnite number of (possibly degenerate) intervals. Given
strategies k1,k2: [0,1] → {0,1}, the payoﬀ function of player i is
ui(p) = E
   ∞
0
re
−rt {ki(pt)g + [1 − ki(pt)]s} dt
 
if, starting from p0 = p, the strategies induce a well-deﬁned and unique law of motion for
the posterior beliefs {pt}t>0; otherwise, ui(p) = −∞.3
Again proceeding as in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), we see that the following Bell-
man equation characterizes player 1’s best responses against his opponent’s strategy k2:
u1(p) = s + k2(p)β1(p,u1) + max
k1∈{0,1}
k1[b1(p,u1) − c1(p)],
where c1(p) = s − pg is the opportunity cost player 1 has to bear when he plays risky,
b1(p,u1) = λ
rp[g − u1(p) − (1 − p)u′
1(p)] is the learning beneﬁt player 1 accrues when he is
playing risky, and β1(p,u1) = λ
r(1−p)[s−u1(p)+pu′
1(p)] is the learning beneﬁt accruing to
player 1 from player 2’s playing risky.4
Analogously, the Bellman equation for player 2 is
u2(p) = s + k1(p)β2(p,u2) + max
k2∈{0,1}
k2[b2(p,u2) − c2(p)],
where c2(p) = s − (1 − p)g is the opportunity cost player 2 has to bear when he plays risky,
b2(p,u2) = λ
r(1−p)[g −u2(p)+pu′
2(p)] is the learning beneﬁt player 2 accrues himself when
playing risky, and β2(p,u2) = λ
rp[s−u2(p)−(1−p)u′
2(p)] is the learning beneﬁt accruing to
player 2 from player 1’s playing risky.
3The law of motion is well-deﬁned and unique if the diﬀerential equation ˙ p = −[k1(p) − k2(p)]λp(1 − p)
possesses a unique global solution for any initial value on the unit interval. This has to be the case in
equilibrium, of course.
4By standard results, player 1’s payoﬀ function from playing a best response against k2 is once continu-
ously diﬀerentiable on any open interval of beliefs where player 2’s action is constant. At a belief where k2
is discontinuous, u′
1(p) must be understood as the one-sided derivative of u1 in the direction implied by the
law of motion of beliefs.
8It is straightforward to obtain closed-form solutions for the payoﬀ functions. If k1(p) =
k2(p) = 0, the players’ payoﬀs are u1(p) = u2(p) = s. If k1(p) = k2(p) = 1, the Bellman
equations yield u1(p) = pg + λ
λ+r(1 − p)s and u2(p) = u1(1 − p). On any interval where
k1(p) = 1 and k2(p) = 0, u1 and u2 satisfy the ODEs
λp(1 − p)u
′
1(p) + (r + λp)u1(p) = (r + λ)pg,
λp(1 − p)u
′
2(p) + (r + λp)u2(p) = (r + λp)s,
which have the solutions u1(p) = pg+C1(1−p)
r+λ
λ p− r




constants of integration C1 and C2, respectively. Finally, on any interval where k1(p) = 0
and k2(p) = 1, u1 and u2 solve
λp(1 − p)u
′
1(p) − [r + λ(1 − p)]u1(p) = −[r + λ(1 − p)]s,
λp(1 − p)u
′
2(p) − [r + λ(1 − p)]u2(p) = −(r + λ)(1 − p)g,
which implies u1(p) = s + C1p
r+λ
λ (1 − p)− r
λ and u2(p) = (1 − p)g + C2p
r+λ
λ (1 − p)− r
λ.
5 Complete Learning
In this section, we shall show that whenever the planner’s solution leads to complete learning,
so will any MPE of the experimentation game. To this end, we ﬁrst establish a lower bound
on equilibrium payoﬀs.
From Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), the optimal payoﬀs of player 1 and 2, if they








s if p ≤ p∗,










if p ≥ p∗
and u∗
2(p) = u∗
1(1−p). Since each player in the experimentation game always has the option
to act as though he were a single player by just ignoring the additional signal he gets from
the other player, it is quite intuitive that he cannot possibly do worse with the other player
around than if he were by himself.5 The following lemma conﬁrms this intuition.
Lemma 5.1 The value function of the respective single-agent problem constitutes a lower
bound on each player’s equilibrium value function in any Markov perfect equilibrium.
5Clearly, this intuition carries over to the case where only a player’s actions are observable, while his
payoﬀs are private information. The results of this section are therefore robust to the introduction of this




r+λ , then p∗ < 1
2 < 1−p∗, so at any belief p, Lemma 5.1 implies u∗
1(p) > s
or u∗
2(p) > s or both. Thus, there cannot exist a p such that k1(p) = k2(p) = 0 be mutually




r+λ , learning will be complete in any Markov perfect equilibrium.
Whenever eﬃciency calls for complete learning, therefore, learning will be complete in
equilibrium. This complete learning result is in stark contrast to the benchmark problem
of perfect positive correlation in Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps
(2005), where there is always a range of beliefs for which learning will be incomplete. This
thus conﬁrms Dewatripont and Tirole’s (1999) ﬁnding that two adversaries at loggerheads
will perform better at (eventually) eliciting the truth than two partners whose interests are
perfectly aligned. Indeed, provided the stakes are high enough, incomplete learning can be
overcome by competition, our analysis shows.
6 Markov Perfect Equilibria
Our next aim is to the characterize the Markov perfect equilibria of the experimentation
game. We treat two MPE as identical if they lead to the same law of motion of posterior
beliefs and the same payoﬀ functions.
The proﬁle of actions (k1,k2) must be (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) or (1,1) at any belief. For
g
s < 2r+λ
r+λ , the proﬁle (1,1) cannot occur in equilibrium since it would imply an average
payoﬀ of u11 < s at the relevant belief, giving at least one player a payoﬀ below s, and hence
below his single-agent optimum. For
g
s > 2r+λ
r+λ , on the other hand, the proﬁle (0,0) cannot
occur since it would imply incomplete learning.








2 ) occurs at the belief ˆ p ∈]0,1[ if

















2 } contains more than one element. Given
our deﬁnition of strategies, each MPE has a ﬁnite number of transitions.
We ﬁrst note that the transitions (0,0)—(1,0)—(0,0) and (0,0)—(0,1)—(0,0) can be
ignored since the law of motion of beliefs and players’ payoﬀs would be the same if both
played safe at ˆ p and so no action changed there at all. Similarly, we can ignore the transitions
(1,1)—(1,0)—(1,1) and (1,1)—(0,1)—(1,1) since the law of motion of beliefs and players’
payoﬀs would be the same if both played risky at ˆ p.




2 ) in equilibrium.
In fact, the law of motion conditional on there being no breakthrough would read ˙ p =
λp(1 − p) on [ˆ p − ǫ, ˆ p[, and ˙ p = −λp(1 − p) at ˆ p. Such a change in sign precludes the
existence of a solution with initial value ˆ p, and so the law of motion of our state variable





We call all transitions that cannot be ignored or have not been ruled out so far admis-
sible. Among these, we ﬁrst consider transitions where one player’s action does not change.
To this end, we note that the cutoﬀ belief above which a myopic player 1 (i.e., a player who is
only interested in maximizing current payoﬀs) would play risky is pm = s
g. A myopic player
2 would play risky at beliefs below the cutoﬀ 1 − pm. Invoking the standard principles of
value matching and smooth pasting, we obtain the following result.



















at 1 − pm.
While it is intuitive that a player would apply the single-agent cutoﬀ rule against an
opponent who plays safe and thus provides no information, it is surprising that the myopic
cutoﬀ determines equilibrium behavior against an opponent who plays risky. Technically,
this result is due to the fact that along player 1’s payoﬀ function for k1 = k2 = 1, his learning





















and so k1 = 1 is optimal against k2 = 1 if and only if c1(p) ≤ 0, that is, p ≥ pm. This is best
understood by recalling the law of motion of beliefs in the absence of a success on either
arm, ˙ p = −(k1 −k2)λp(1−p), which tells us that if both players are playing risky, the state
variable does not budge. In other words, all a player does by chiming in in his opponent’s
experimentation is to keep the belief, his action and his continuation value constant until the
ﬁrst success occurs. But this can only be optimal if he reaps maximal current payoﬀs while
he waits for the resolution of uncertainty. So his playing the risky arm must be myopically
optimal.
In the following lemma, we pin down the conditions under which some of the remaining
admissible transitions may occur in equilibrium.
6Similar problems have already been treated in the decision-theoretic literature. To guarantee a well-
deﬁned law of motion of posterior beliefs, Presman (1990) allows for simultaneous use of both arms, i.e. for
experimentation intensities kt ∈ [0,1].
11Lemma 6.2 The following statements hold for all Markov perfect equilibria. (i) The transi-
tion (0,1)—(0,0)—(1,0) can only occur if
g
s = 2r+λ
r+λ and only at belief 1
2. (ii) The transition
(1,0)—(0,0)—(0,1) can only occur if
g
s ≤ 2r+λ
r+λ and only at beliefs in [1 − p∗,p∗]. (iii)
The transition (0,1)—(1,1)—(1,0) can only occur if 2r+λ
r+λ ≤
g
s ≤ 2 and only at beliefs in
[1 − pm,pm]. (iv) The transition (1,0)—(1,1)—(0,1) can only occur if
g
s ≥ 2 and only at
beliefs in [pm,1 − pm].









2 )—(1,0)—(0,1). We will see later that they cannot occur
in equilibrium.
The structure of Markov perfect equilibria depends on the relative position of the pos-
sible transition points, which in turn depends on the stakes involved, i.e. on the ratio
g
s. For
expositional reasons, we shall ﬁrst analyze the case of very low and that of very high stakes.
6.1 Low Stakes
The low-stakes case is deﬁned by the inequality
g
s < 2r+λ
r+λ . In this case, 1 − pm < 1 − p∗ <
1




r+λ , the unique Markov perfect equilibrium coincides with the
planner’s solution. That is, player 1 plays risky at beliefs above p∗, and safe below p∗, while
player 2 plays risky at beliefs below 1 − p∗, and safe above 1 − p∗. Player 1’s behavior at p∗
and player 2’s behavior at 1 − p∗ are of no consequence. The pertaining value functions are
those of the respective single-agent problems, u∗
1 and u∗
2.
Figure 3 illustrates this result.7 The players’ average payoﬀ function coincides with the
planner’s value function as stated in Proposition 3.1 and shown in Figure 1.
Why we should have eﬃciency in this case is intuitively quite clear, as the planner basi-
cally lets players behave as though they were single players. As p∗ > 1
2, there is no spillover
from a player behaving like a single agent on the other player’s optimization problem. Hence
the latter’s best response calls for behaving like a single player as well. Thus, there is no
conﬂict between social and private incentives.
The law of motion for the belief and the probability of the players’ eventually ﬁnding
out the true state of the world are thus the same as in the planner’s solution for low stakes.
7In this and all subsequent ﬁgures, the thick solid line depicts the value function of player 1, the thin















The high-stakes case is deﬁned by the inequality
g
s > 2. In this case, p∗ < pm < 1




s > 2, the game has a unique Markov perfect equilibrium, in which
both players behave myopically. That is, player 1 plays risky at beliefs above pm, and safe
below pm, while player 2 plays risky at beliefs below 1 − pm, and safe above 1 − pm. Player
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if p ≤ pm,
pg + λ












if p ≥ 1 − pm
and u2(p) = u1(1 − p).
Thus, the unique equilibrium calls for both players’ behaving myopically. This is best
understood by recalling from our discussion above that individual optimality calls for myopic
behavior whenever one’s opponent is playing risky. When the stakes are high, players’ myopic
cutoﬀ beliefs are more pessimistic than p = 1
2, so the relevant intervals overlap.
Figure 4 illustrates this result. Player 1’s value function has a kink at 1 − pm, where
player 2 changes action. Symmetrically, player 2’s value function has a kink at pm, where
13player 1 changes action. As a consequence, the average payoﬀ function has a kink both at
pm and at 1 − pm. That it dips below the level u11 close to these kinks is evidence of the









1 − pm 1
u2 u1
Figure 4: The equilibrium value functions for
g
s > 2.
Arguing exactly as after Proposition 3.2, it is straightforward to see that learning will
be complete, as predicted by Proposition 5.2.
6.3 Intermediate Stakes
This case is deﬁned by the condition that 2r+λ
r+λ <
g
s < 2. In this case, p∗ < 1
2 < pm.
When the stakes are intermediate in size, equilibrium is not unique; rather there is a
continuum of equilibria, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 6.5 When 2r+λ
r+λ <
g
s < 2, there is a continuum of Markov perfect equilibria.
Each of them is characterized by a unique belief ˆ p ∈ [max{1−pm,p∗},min{pm,1−p∗}] such
that player 1 plays risky at all beliefs p ≥ ˆ p, and player 2 at all beliefs p ≤ ˆ p. The pertaining
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if p ≤ ˆ p
s +
 
(1 − ˆ p)g + λ










if p ≥ ˆ p
for player 2.
Amongst the continuum of equilibria characterized in Proposition 6.5, there is a unique
symmetric one, given by ˆ p = 1
2. Figure 5 illustrates this equilibrium. Both players’ value
functions and their average are kinked at p = 1
2, where both players change action. At any
belief except p = 1
2, the average payoﬀ function is below the planner’s solution; if the initial
belief is p0 = 1




















λp(1 − p) if p < ˆ p,
0 if p = ˆ p,
−λp(1 − p) if p > ˆ p.
As predicted by Proposition 5.2, learning is complete in all these equilibria.
6.4 Eﬃciency vs. Myopia
As we have pointed out already, when the stakes are low, players do not interfere with each
other’s optimization problem and behave as though they were all by themselves. We have
15seen that this kind of behavior is also eﬃcient.
If stakes are high, however, we have seen that players behave myopically. This implies
that in the unique MPE, experimentation is at eﬃcient levels except on [¯ p,pm]∪[1−pm,1−
¯ p], the union of two non-empty and non-degenerate intervals, where experimentation is
ineﬃciently low. Put diﬀerently, there is a region of beliefs where one player free-rides on
the other player’s experimentation, which is ineﬃcient from a social point of view.
In the case of intermediate stakes, equilibrium behavior changes gradually from eﬃciency








r+λ, then the lower
bound on the equilibrium cutoﬀ ˆ p satisﬁes max{p∗,1 − pm} ≤ ¯ p. Now, if the players’ initial
belief is p0 > ¯ p, the equilibrium with ˆ p = ¯ p achieves eﬃciency as the only beliefs that
are reached with positive probability under the equilibrium strategies are given by the set
{0,1} ∪ [p0, ˆ p], and the equilibrium strategies prescribe the eﬃcient actions at all of these
beliefs. Similarly, for p0 < 1 − ¯ p, eﬃciency is achieved by the equilibrium with ˆ p = 1 − ¯ p.
Finally, if ¯ p ≤ p0 ≤ 1 − ¯ p, eﬃciency is achieved by the equilibrium with ˆ p = p0, since this








s < 2, then p∗ < ¯ p < 1−pm. Now, suppose ¯ p ≤ p0 < 1−pm.
Equilibrium uniquely calls for (k1,k2)(p) = (0,1) for all p ≤ 1−pm, whereas eﬃciency would
require (k1,k2)(p) = (1,1) whenever ¯ p < p ≤ 1 − ¯ p. Thus, equilibrium implies ineﬃcient
play on the interval ]¯ p,1 − pm[ which is reached with positive probability given the initial
belief p0.









r+λ, then for each initial belief, there ex-













s < 2, then pm ≤ 1 − p∗. In this situation, setting ˆ p = pm (ˆ p = 1 − pm)
yields an equilibrium where only player 1 (player 2) behaves myopically, while the other
player bears the entire burden of experimentation by himself, something he is only willing
to do provided the stakes involved exceed the threshold of 1+
  r
r+λ. In view of our ﬁndings





r+λ, there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium where at least
16one of the players behaves myopically. If
g
s < 1 +
  r
r+λ, no player behaves myopically in
equilibrium.










equilibria where one player behaves myopically co-exist with equilibria that achieve eﬃciency
given the initial belief.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed a game of strategic experimentation in continuous time where players’
interests are diametrically opposed. We have found that, in very sharp contrast to the case
where players’ interests are perfectly aligned, all the equilibria are of the cutoﬀ type, and that
for a large subset of parameters, equilibrium is unique. When the stakes are low, equilibrium
behavior is eﬃcient, whereas for high stakes players behave myopically.
In our analysis, we have restricted ourselves to what in the literature has been termed
“pure strategy equilibria” (by Bolton and Harris, 1999, and 2000) or “‘simple equilibria” (by
Keller, Rady and Cripps, 2005, and Keller and Rady, 2007). Our results on eﬃciency, as
well as our complete learning result, are robust to an extension of the strategy space where
players are allowed to choose experimentation intensities from the entire unit interval.
Our ﬁnding that incomplete learning, which hitherto has been a staple result of the
strategic two-armed bandit literature, can be overcome by competition, may be interesting
as a building block for more applied models with a richer structure. For instance, it may
constitute a microfoundation for the empirical fact that democracy and decentralization will
foster investments in risky R&D and innovation. For example, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi
(2007) were able to show empirically that democracy and political rights enhance the growth
of technologically more advanced sectors, which rely more heavily on innovation and R&D.
They showed to boot that an important channel by which democracy spurs the growth of
the more advanced sectors is freedom of entry, which obviously encourages competition.
17Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The policy (k1,k2) implies a well-deﬁned law of motion for the posterior belief. The function u
satisﬁes value matching and smooth pasting at p∗ and 1 − p∗, hence is of class C1. It is strictly
decreasing on [0,1 − p∗] and strictly increasing on [p∗,1]. Moreover, u = s + B2 − c2
2 on [0,1 − p∗],
u = s on [1 − p∗,p∗], and u = s + B1 − c1
2 on [p∗,1] (we drop the arguments for simplicity), which
shows that u is indeed the planner’s payoﬀ function from (k1,k2).
To show that u and this policy (k1,k2) solve the planner’s Bellman equation, and hence that
(k1,k2) is optimal, it is enough to establish that B1 < c1
2 and B2 > c2
2 on ]0,1 − p∗[, B1 < c1
2
and B2 < c2
2 on ]1 − p∗,p∗[, and B1 > c1
2 and B2 < c2
2 on ]p∗,1[. Consider this last interval.
There, u = s + B1 − c1









2 ; this is smaller than c2
2 if and only if u > u11, which
holds here since u > s and s > u11. The other two intervals are treated in a similar way.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proof proceeds along the same lines as the previous one and is therefore omitted.
For p ∈ [0,1], we now deﬁne
w1(p) = pg +
λ
λ + r
(1 − p)s and w2(p) = w1(1 − p).
Furthermore, we deﬁne the players’ expected full-information payoﬀs:
u1(p) = pg + (1 − p)s and u2(p) = (1 − p)g + ps.
We then get the following lemma:
Lemma A.1 k1(p) = 1 is a best response to k2(p) = 1 on some non-degenerate interval of beliefs
if and only if u1(p) ≤ w1(p) on that interval. Similarly, k2(p) = 1 is a best response to k1(p) = 1
on some non-degenerate interval if and only if u2(p) ≥ w2(p) on that interval.
Proof: We ﬁrst note that b1(p,u1) = λ
r [u1(p) − u1(p)]−β1(p,u1), and, analogously, that b2(p,u2) =
λ
r [u2(p) − u2(p)] − β2(p,u2). We also note that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for k1(p) = 0
to be a best response to k2(p) = 1 on some interval of beliefs is that u1(p) = s + β1(p,u1) and
b1(p,u1) ≤ c1(p), which in turn requires that c1(p) ≥ λ
r [u1(p) − u1(p)] − [u1(p) − s], which is the
same as u1(p) ≥ w1(p). Analogously, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for k2(p) = 0 to be a best
response to k1(p) = 1 on some interval of beliefs is that u2(p) ≥ w2(p).
Proof of Lemma 5.1





1). Henceforth, we shall suppress arguments whenever
18this is convenient. Since p∗ is the single-agent cutoﬀ belief for player 1, we have u∗
1 = s for p ≤ p∗
and u∗
1 = s+b∗
1 −c1 = pg +b∗
1 for p > p∗. Thus, if p ≤ p∗, the claim obviously holds as s is a lower
bound on u1.
Now, let p > p∗. Then, noting that b∗
1 = u∗






1 > 0 if and only if u∗
1 < pg + λ
λ+r(1 − p)s = w1. Noting that w1(p∗) = u∗
1(p∗) = s,
w1(1) = u∗
1(1) = g, and that w1 is linear whereas u∗
1 is strictly convex in p, we conclude that
u∗
1 < w1 and hence β∗
1 > 0 on ]p∗,1[. As a consequence, we have u∗





Now, suppose u1 < u∗
1 at some belief. Since s is a lower bound on u1, this implies existence of a
belief strictly greater than p∗ where u1 < u∗
1 and u′
1 ≤ (u∗
1)′. This immediately yields b1 > b∗
1 > c1,
so that we must have k1 = 1 and u1 = pg + k2β1 + b1 at the belief in question. But now,
u1 − u∗
1 ≥ pg + k2β1 + b1 − (pg + k2β∗
1 + b∗










An analogous argument applies for player 2’s equilibrium value function u2.
Proof of Lemma 6.1
At each of these admissible transitions, we must have value matching and smooth pasting for the
player who changes his action. For example, suppose that there is a transition (0,0)—(0,0)—
(1,0) at the belief ˆ p. Then the value function of player 1 must satisfy u1(ˆ p) = s, u′
1(ˆ p) = 0 and
λˆ p(1− ˆ p)u′
1(ˆ p)+(r +λˆ p)u1(ˆ p) = (r +λ)ˆ pg by the ODE for (k1,k2) = (1,0). Substituting for u1(ˆ p)
and u′
1(ˆ p) and solving yields ˆ p = rs
(r+λ)g−λs = p∗. The other transitions are dealt with in the same
way.
Proof of Lemma 6.2
Suppose the transition (0,1)—(0,0)—(1,0) occurs at belief ˆ p. This implies u1(ˆ p) = u2(ˆ p) = s.
Moreover, to the left of ˆ p, player 2’s value function solves the ODE for k1 = 0 and k2 = 1,
which, by continuity of u2, implies λˆ p(1 − ˆ p)u′
2(ˆ p−) = [r + λ(1 − ˆ p)]s − (r + λ)(1 − ˆ p)g, where
u′
2(ˆ p−) = limp↑ˆ p u′
2(p). Now, if ˆ p > 1 − p∗, then u′
2(ˆ p−) > 0 and so u2(p) < s immediately to the
left of ˆ p – a contradiction. So we must have ˆ p ≤ 1−p∗. To the right of ˆ p, player 1’s value function
solves the ODE for k1 = 1 and k2 = 0, which implies λˆ p(1 − ˆ p)u′
1(ˆ p+) = (r + λ)ˆ pg − (r + λˆ p)s,
where u′
1(ˆ p+) = limp↓ˆ p u′
1(p). If ˆ p < p∗, then u′
1(ˆ p+) < 0 and u1(p) < s immediately to the right of








Thus, we must have
g
s = 2r+λ
r+λ and so p∗ = 1 − p∗ = 1
2. This proves statement (i).
Next, suppose the transition (1,0)—(0,0)—(0,1) occurs at belief ˆ p. This implies u1(ˆ p) =
u2(ˆ p) = s. Now, player 2’s value function solves the ODE for k1 = 0 and k2 = 1 to the right of ˆ p,
and so we ﬁnd u′
2(ˆ p+) < 0 whenever ˆ p < 1−p∗. Player 1’s value function solves the ODE for k1 = 1
19and k2 = 0 to the left of ˆ p, and so u′




r+λ . This proves statement (ii).
Suppose now that the transition (0,1)—(1,1)—(1,0) occurs at belief ˆ p. This implies u1(ˆ p) =
w1(ˆ p) and u2(ˆ p) = w2(ˆ p). To the right of ˆ p, player 2’ value function solves the ODE for k1 = 1 and
k2 = 0, which implies
u′
2(ˆ p+) =
r + λˆ p
λˆ p(1 − ˆ p)
 
r + λ(1 − ˆ p)
r + λ
s − (1 − ˆ p)g
 
.
Now, if ˆ p < 1 − pm, then u′
2(ˆ p+) < w′
2(ˆ p) and so u2 < w2 to the immediate right of ˆ p, implying by
Lemma A.1 that k2 = 0 is not a best response to k1 = 1 there – a contradiction. Thus, we must




r + λ(1 − ˆ p)
λˆ p(1 − ˆ p)
 
ˆ pg −





If ˆ p > pm, then u′
1(ˆ p−) > w′
1(ˆ p) and so u1 < w1 to the immediate left of ˆ p – another contradiction
to Lemma A.1. So we must have ˆ p ∈ [1 − pm,pm], which requires
g
s ≤ 2. Furthermore, we note




This proves statement (iii).
Finally, suppose the transition (1,0)—(1,1)—(0,1) occurs at belief ˆ p. Again, this implies
u1(ˆ p) = w1(ˆ p) and u2(ˆ p) = w2(ˆ p). Now, player 2’s value function solves the ODE for k1 = 1 and
k2 = 0 to the left of ˆ p, and so we ﬁnd u′
2(ˆ p−) > w′
2(ˆ p) whenever ˆ p > 1 − pm. Player 1’s value
function solves the ODE for k1 = 0 and k2 = 1 to the right of ˆ p, and so u′
1(ˆ p+) < w′
1(ˆ p) whenever
ˆ p < pm. Thus we must have ˆ p ∈ [pm,1−pm], which requires
g
s ≥ 2. This proves statement (iv).
Proof of Proposition 6.3
The policies k1 and k2 induce a well-deﬁned law of motion for the posterior belief. The functions
u1 and u2 are of class C1 with u2 strictly decreasing on [0,1 − p∗] and u1 strictly increasing on
[p∗,1]. As u2 = s+b2 −c2 on [0,1−p∗] and u1 = s+b1 −c1 on [p∗,1] (we drop the arguments for
simplicity), u1 and u2 are indeed the players’ payoﬀ functions for (k1,k2).
To show that u1 and the policy k1 solve player 1’s Bellman equation given player 2’s strategy
k2, and hence that k1 is a best response to k2, it is enough to establish that b1 < c1 on ]0,p∗[
and b1 > c1 on ]p∗,1[. On this last interval, u = s + b1 − c1 and u1 > s (by monotonicity
of u1) immediately imply b1 > c1. On ]0,p∗[, we have u1 = s and u′




r p−s < 0. As u2(p) = u1(1−p) and k2(p) = k1(1−p), the previous
steps also imply b2 > c2 on ]0,1 − p∗[ and b2 < c2 on ]1 − p∗,1[, which completes the proof that
(k1,k2) constitutes an equilibrium.
For uniqueness, we note that, as g > s, k1(1) = k2(0) = 1 and k1(0) = k2(1) = 0 in any MPE.
Recall that as u11 < s, the action proﬁle (k1,k2) = (1,1) cannot be part of an MPE since this would
involve a payoﬀ strictly below s for at least one player at some belief. Of the transitions considered
in Lemma 6.2, only (1,0)—(0,0)—(0,1) could happen in this case, and it could only occur at some
20belief ˆ p ∈ [1−p∗,p∗]. Moreover, besides the transitions considered in Lemma 6.1, only the following
transitions could potentially arise here: (1,0)—(0,1)—(0,0), (1,0)—(0,1)—(0,1), (1,0)—(1,0)—
(0,1), (0,0)—(1,0)—(0,1). It thus follows that in any MPE, players can only transition out of
(0,1) = (k1(0),k2(0)) at belief 1−p∗, and have to move into (0,0) to the immediate right of 1−p∗.
As (k1(1),k2(1)) = (1,0), players cannot transition back into (0,1) to the right of 1 − p∗. Since
the only way for the players to transition from (0,0) into (1,0) would be via smooth pasting at
p∗, (1,0)—(0,1)—(0,0) could only happen to the right of p∗, implying k1(1) = 0 – a contradiction.
Since (1,0)—(0,0)—(1,0) could potentially only happen at p∗, and (0,1)—(0,0)—(0,1) only at
1 − p∗, these two transitions cannot occur either.
Proof of Proposition 6.4
The policies k1 and k2 induce a well-deﬁned law of motion for the posterior belief. The functions
u1 and u2 are of class C1 except at 1 − pm and pm, respectively, where their ﬁrst derivative jumps
downward; u1 is strictly increasing, u2 strictly decreasing. Moreover, u1 = s+β1 and u2 = s+b2−c2
on [0,pm], u1 = s+β1 +b1 −c1 and u2 = s+β2 +b2 −c2 on [pm,1−pm], and u1 = s+b1 −c1 and
u2 = s + β2 on [1 − pm,1]. So u1 and u2 are indeed the players’ payoﬀ functions for (k1,k2).
To show that u1 and the policy k1 solve player 1’s Bellman equation given player 2’s strategy
k2, and hence that k1 is a best response to k2, it is enough to establish that b1 < c1 on ]0,pm[
and b1 > c1 on ]pm,1[. On ]1 − pm,1[, u1 = s + b1 − c1 and u1 > s (by monotonicity of u1)
immediately imply b1 > c1. On ]pm,1 − pm[, we have b1 = 0 > c1. On ]0,pm[, u1 = s + β1 and
b1 + β1 = λ
r[pg + (1 − p)s − u1] imply b1 − c1 = λ
r[pg + (1 − p)s] − (1 + λ
r)u1 + pg. This is strictly
smaller than 0 if and only if u1 > w1, which is easily veriﬁed for the interval under consideration.
As u2(p) = u1(1 − p) and k2(p) = k1(1 − p), the previous steps also imply b2 > c2 on ]0,1 − pm[
and b2 < c2 on ]1 − pm,1[, which completes the proof that (k1,k2) constitutes an equilibrium.
For uniqueness, we note that, as g > s, k1(1) = k2(0) = 1 and k1(0) = k2(1) = 0 in any
MPE. Recall that the action proﬁle (k1,k2) = (0,0) cannot be part of an MPE since it would
imply incomplete learning. It thus follows immediately from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 that the only way
for players to transition out of (0,1) is for them to switch to (1,1) at pm. Thus, players cannot
transition back into (0,1) to the right of pm. Therefore, again using Lemma 6.1, the only way
to transition out of (1,1) is to switch to (1,0) at 1 − pm. Hence, players cannot transition back
to (1,1) or (0,1) to the right of 1 − pm. As, by Lemma 6.1, the transitions (1,0)—(1,1)—(1,0)
and (1,1)—(1,0)—(1,1) could potentially only happen at 1 − pm, and (0,1)—(1,1)—(0,1) and
(1,1)—(0,1)—(1,1) only at pm, these transitions cannot occur either.
Proof of Proposition 6.5
The policies k1 and k2 induce a well-deﬁned law of motion for the posterior belief with an absorbing
state at ˆ p. The functions u1 and u2 are of class C1 except at ˆ p, where their ﬁrst derivatives jump;
u1 is strictly increasing, u2 strictly decreasing. Moreover, u1 = s+β1 and u2 = s+b2−c2 on [0, ˆ p[,
u1 and u2 coincide with w1 and w2, respectively, at ˆ p, and u1 = s + b1 − c1 and u2 = s + β2 on
21]ˆ p,1]. So u1 and u2 are indeed the players’ payoﬀ functions for (k1,k2).
As u1 > w1 and u2 > s on [0, ˆ p[, we have b1 < c1 and b2 > c2 on this interval. Similarly, as
u1 > s and u2 > w2 on ]ˆ p,1], we have b1 > c1 and b2 < c2 there. Finally, continuity of u1 and u2
implies b1(ˆ p−,u1) = c1(ˆ p) < b1(ˆ p+,u1) and b2(ˆ p+,u2) = c2(ˆ p) < b2(ˆ p−,u2). Now consider player
1 at the belief ˆ p. Whatever action he chooses, the belief can only drift upward conditional on there
being no success, so it is the right-hand derivative of u1, and hence the right limit b1(ˆ p+,u1), that
matters in the Bellman equation. As this limit is strictly below c1(ˆ p), player 1’s strict best response
at ˆ p is to play risky. An analogous argument works for player 2. This establishes that k1 and k2
are mutual best responses at all beliefs.
To see that there are no other equilibria, note again that in any MPE (k1,k2)(1) = (1,0) and
(k1,k2)(0) = (0,1). Moreover, by Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2, there might potentially be two ways of
transitioning out of (0,1), namely either via (0,1)—(1,1)—(1,0), which by Lemma 6.2 can only
happen at points in the interval [1 − pm,pm], or via (0,1)—(0,1)—(1,1) or (0,1)—(1,1)—(1,1),
which by Lemma 6.1 can only happen at pm. Now, suppose that there exists an MPE where players
transition from (0,1) into (1,1) at pm. To the right of pm, players cannot transition back into (0,1)
as, to the right of pm, there is no way for them to transition out of (0,1) again. Moreover, they can
only transition from (1,1) to (1,0) via (1,1)—(1,1)—(1,0) or (1,1)—(1,0)—(1,0), both of which
can only happen at 1 − pm < pm. Thus, in such an MPE, we must have (k1,k2)(1) = (1,1) – a
contradiction.
Therefore, in any MPE, there exists a belief ˆ p ∈ [1−pm,pm] at which a transition of the form
(0,1)—(1,1)—(1,0) occurs. Now, the only ways for the players to transition out of (1,0) to the
right of ˆ p are the following: (1,0)—(1,0)—(0,1), (1,0)—(0,1)—(0,1) or (1,0)—(0,1)—(1,1), since
by Lemma 6.1 (1,0)—(1,0)—(1,1) and (1,0)—(1,1)—(1,1) can only occur at 1−pm, and Lemma
6.2(iv) rules out (1,0)—(1,1)—(0,1).
Suppose therefore there exists a belief p† > ˆ p at which a transition of the form (1,0)—




λ = w1(p†). By the same token, we have u1(ˆ p) = ˆ pg + C(1 − ˆ p)
r+λ
λ ˆ p− r
λ = w1(ˆ p). Both












λ+rs – a contradiction because the function
p  →
p
1−p is strictly monotone.
Now, suppose there exists a p‡ > ˆ p where a transition either of the form (1,0)—(0,1)—(0,1)
or (1,0)—(1,0)—(0,1) occurs. Take p‡ to be the smallest such belief. By continuity and Lemma
A.1, we have u1(p‡) ≥ w1(p‡). Yet we also have that u1(ˆ p) = w1(ˆ p) – a contradiction since w1 is
linear, and on any non-degenerate interval where the action proﬁle (1,0) prevails, player 1’s value
function is easily seen to be strictly convex.
Hence we have shown that in any MPE, players will not transition out of (1,0) to the right
of ˆ p. This already implies uniqueness of ˆ p. The only transitions that remain to be ruled out are
(1,0)—(1,1)—(1,0) and (0,1)—(1,1)—(0,1), which by Lemma 6.1 can only occur at the beliefs
1 − pm and pm, respectively. If (1,0)—(1,1)—(1,0) did occur at 1 − pm, (1,0) would be played to
the left of 1 − pm – a contradiction. And if (0,1)—(1,1)—(0,1) occurred at pm, (0,1) would be
played to the right of pm – another contradiction.
22Thus, we have shown that there is exactly one transition in any MPE, occurring at a belief
ˆ p ∈ [1 − pm,pm]. For the case where pm > 1 − p∗, we shall now show that in fact ˆ p ∈ [p∗,1 − p∗].
Indeed, suppose that ˆ p < p∗. Then, ˆ pg + λ
λ+r(1− ˆ p)s < s and, by the explicit expression for player
1’s value function, u1 < s on ]0, ˆ p[, which is incompatible with player 1 playing a best response.
By an analogous argument, we can rule out ˆ p > 1 − p∗.
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